REVIEW OF GAME THEORY IN COUPLED ELECTRICITY-CERTIFICATE-CARBON MARKETS

Liu Jun; Wang Peng; Lyu Xiaoyuan; Xiao Peiqing; Guo Hongxia

doi:10.19912/j.0254-0096.tynxb.2024-2319

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Acta Energiae Solaris Sinica ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (5) : 37-47. DOI: 10.19912/j.0254-0096.tynxb.2024-2319

REVIEW OF GAME THEORY IN COUPLED ELECTRICITY-CERTIFICATE-CARBON MARKETS

Liu Jun¹, Wang Peng², Lyu Xiaoyuan¹, Xiao Peiqing³, Guo Hongxia³

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Abstract

In response to issues such as significant conflicts of interest among multiple stakeholders, the interdependence of trading strategies, and the complexity of market coordination mechanisms in electric-certificate-carbon market, this paper reviews the application of game theory in such markets.Firstly, the trading framework and game behavior of the electric-certificate-carbon market are proposed, the coupling role of the electric-certificate-carbon market and the game behavior existing in the coupled market are introduced, and the correlation between the prices of each market as well as the diversity of the behaviors of the participants subjects are emphasized. Subsequently, the important concepts of classical and evolutionary games and their specific applications in the coupled electric-certificate-carbon market are elaborated in detail, including the analysis of market equilibrium state , the selection of optimal strategies and the design of policy parameters. Finally, the future application of game theory in the coupled electric-certificate-carbon market is envisioned.

Key words

game theory / Nash equilibrium / electricity markets / carbon market / green certificate market / evolutionary game

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Liu Jun, Wang Peng, Lyu Xiaoyuan, Xiao Peiqing, Guo Hongxia. REVIEW OF GAME THEORY IN COUPLED ELECTRICITY-CERTIFICATE-CARBON MARKETS[J]. Acta Energiae Solaris Sinica. 2026, 47(5): 37-47 https://doi.org/10.19912/j.0254-0096.tynxb.2024-2319

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